Patricia Mellor, James White, Nedra Allred, Thomas Pirtle and Tonia Pirtle v. Mark Cook, Bryant Madsen, Kenneth Strate, (and Thomas R. Blonquist) : Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Patricia Mellor, James White, Nedra Allred,
Thomas Pirtle and Tonia Pirtle v. Mark Cook,
Bryant Madsen, Kenneth Strate, (and Thomas R.
Blonquist) : Brief of Plaintiffs-Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Arthur H. Nielsen, Earl Jay Peck, Bruce J. Nelson; Attorneys for
Plaintiffs-RespondentsRobert C. Fillerup; Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Mellor v. Cook, No. 15639 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1080
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA MELLOR, JAMES WHITE; 
NEDRA ALLRED, THOMAS PIRTLE 
and TONIA PIRTLE, 
-vs-
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
MARK COOK, BRYANT MADSEN, 
KENNETH STRATE, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Civil No. 15639 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SANPETE COUNTY, HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, JUDGE 
bert C. Fillerup 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Earl Jay Peck 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Responde~ts 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
A ARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 12~0rneys for Defendants-Appellants p East 300 North Street 
rovo, Utah 84601 
FILED 
JUL 2 5 1978 
............ -------------------------.. ···-
Clerk. Supremo Court, Utah 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRI-CIA MELLOR, JAMES WHITE, 
NEDRA ALLRED, THOMAS PIRTLE 
and TONIA PIRTLE, 
-vs-
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
MARK COOK, BRYANT MADSEN, 
KENNETH STRATE, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Civil No. 15639 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
APPEAL FROM THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SANPETE COUNTY, HONORABLE DON V. TIBBS, JUDGE 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Earl Jay Peck 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Robert C. Fillerup 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON 
~ttorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
20 East 300 North Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA MELLOR, JAMES WHITE, 
NEDRA ALLRED, THOMAS PIRTLE 
and TGNIA PIRTLE, 
-vs-
Plaintiffs-
Respondents, 
MARK COOK, BRYANT MADSEN, 
KENNETH STRATE, 
Defendants-
Appellants. 
Civil No. 156 39 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendants-Appell~nts appeal the order of the Sixth 
Judicial District Court of Sanpete County, State of Utah, 
holding the Appellants and their attorney in contempt of court. 
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT 
The lower court ruled that the Appellants and Thomas R. 
Blonquist, their attorney wilfully violated the express terms 
of a temporary restraining order within a few hours of a valid 
service of said order upon them. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Respondents seek an affirmation of the lower court's 
iudgrnent. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondents agree with the Statement of Facts set 
forth in Appellants' brief as an adequate narration of the 
circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POii'lT I 
JUDGE DEE HAD "AUTHORITY" TO HEAR 
AND SIGN THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER. 
Appellants first assert that Judge Dee had no 
"authority" to hear Plaintiffs-Respondents' Motion for Temper 
ary Restraining Order on September 22, 1977. In Appellants' 
attempt to discredit Judge Dee's authority to hear the motion, 
they rely on Section 78-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
which they claim prohibited Judge Dee from hearing the matter. 
That section states as follows: 
78-3-14. Ex parte applications from another 
district. A judge of the district court may, in 
his own district, hear any ex parte application, 
and make any order concerning the same, in any 
action or proceeding pending or about to be com-
menced in another judicial district, in the 
following cases: 
(1) Upon the written request of the judge of the 
district in which the action or proceeding is at 
the time pending or is about to be commenced. 
(2) When it shall be made to appear by affidavit 
to the satisfaction of such judge that the judge 
of the district court in which the action or 
proceeding is at the time pending or is about.to 
be commenced is absent from his district, or is 
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incapacitated, or is disqualified to act therein; 
such application shall be made only to the judge 
of the adjoining district. 
Appellants submit that there was no "written" request 
by Judge Tibbs so that any reassignment would have to come 
under subsection (2). Under that subsection, Appellants sub-
mit that a judge in the Third Judicial District is not 
adjoining to the Sixth Judicial District and hence had no 
authority to hear the matter. 
Appellants' reliance on the above-quoted section is 
unfounded. Subsection (1) of Section 78-3-14 deals with 
situations where a Judge wishes to personally assign a hearing 
to a Judge of another district. For example, if Judge Tibbs 
had called Judge Dee himself and requested the latter to 
handle the hearing for him, the procedure would have had to 
follow the guidelines of Subsection 78-3-14(1) and Judge Tibbs 
would have had to make a "written request". 
Subsection (2) deals with situations where a judge in 
a bordering district is asked by the parties themselves to 
hear a motion. In that case, the guidelines require the appli-
cation be made to a judge of an "adjoining district"and can 
only be granted where the "adjoining" judge finds through 
"affidavit" that the first judge is absent from his district, 
is incapacitated, or is disqualified. Thus, for the present 
situation to fall under Subsection 78-3-14(2), the Plaintiffs 
-3-
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would have had to contact Judge Dee themselves and request the 
hearing. Such was not the case. 
The procedure followed herein was not the case of 
Judge Tibbs personally contacting Judge Dee, nor was it a case 
of the Plaintiffs personally contacting Judge Dee. It is a 
case where Judge Tibbs channelled the assignment of Judge Dee 
through the Court Administrator's Office pursuant to Section 
78-3-18 et ~· of the Utah Code Annotated (1953)("Court Admin-
istrator Act"). It goes without saying that an assignment of 
judges by the Court Administrator's Office falls within the 
guidelines of the Court Administrator Act and not within the 
framework of the statute regulating assignments by judges 
themselves. 
The Court Administrator Act establishes an administra-
tive system for Utah courts to provide uniformity and coordi-
nation in the administration of justice. See §78-3-19, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). 
Among the powers delegated to the Administrator's 
Office by Section 78-3-24 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) are 
the following: 
(k} Schedule trials or court sessions and 
designate a judge to preside at said trials 
or court sessions, 
* * * 
(m) Assign judges within courts and throughout 
the state, and reassign cases to judges. 
(emphasis added). 
-4-
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Thus, as Judge Tibbs was out of his district and their 
being no other judge therein who could hear Plaintiff's Motion 
for a Temporary Restraining Order, he called the Court Admin-
istrator's Office pursuant to the statute for reassignment of 
the hearing of Plaintiff's motion to another judge. Ronald w. 
Gibson, Assistant Court Administrator thereupon assigned Judge 
David Dee of the Third District to sit in Judge Tibbs' stead 
and hear the Motion. (R. at 57). 
POINT II 
JUDGE DEE HAD "JURISDICTION" TO SIGN THE 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER. 
In justifying their decision to ignore the Temporary 
Restraining Order, Appellants rely upon Rule 3(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedur~ which states that jurisdiction of the 
court takes effect when a complaint is filed or a surrunons is 
served. 
Rule 3(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets 
out the general rule that a court acquires jurisdiction in a 
matter when the complaint is filed or the surrunons is served. 
However, it does not prevent the issuance of the summons by 
the attorney and placing it in the hands of the sheriff for 
service. Nor does such a rule prevent a court from issuing 
orders in a matter, including a temporary restraining order, 
~fore the complaint was filed. 
-5-
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It is clear that a court may issue a temporary 
restraining order at any time, not only after a complaint has 
been filed, but prior to the actual docketing of the pleadi~. 
As a matter of fact, this is a rather well known practice, 
i.e., to present all the papers to the Court for signature a~ 
thereafter to file them with the Clerk. 
That a court may grant a temporary restraining order 
before pleadings are on file is evidenced by the language in 
Section 78-3-14 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953), which is 
the section relied heavily upon by Appellants. This section 
deals with the authority of a judge in one district to assi~ 
a judge in another district the jurisdiction to hear ex parte 
motions. Although Plaintiff does not believe it necessary to 
rely on this section to confer authority on Judge Dee to hear 
the Motion (see §78-3-18, et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953)), 
the language of the statute is instructive: 
A judge of the district court may, in his own 
district, hear any ex parte application, and 
make any order concerning the same, in any 
action or proceeding pending or about to be 
commenced in another judicial district .. · 
(Emphasis added) U.C.A., §78-3-14 (Repl. Vol. 
9A 1977) 
If, as Appellants suggest, it is necessary for the 
complaint to be filed in a case before the court can hear an 
ex parte motion, the words "pending or about to be commenced" 
are meaningless. The clear language thereof implies that a 
-6-
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motion for a temporary restraining order can be heard before 
the complaint is filed because that would constitute an action 
"about to be commenced." Judge Dee was informed that the 
papers were being taken to Manti for filing later that afternoon, 
so he obviously knew the action was "about to be commenced." 
Rule 65(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
governs the issuance of injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders. Nowhere therein can be found a requirement that 
pleadings must have been previously filed before the court may 
issue a temporary restraining order. To the contrary, language 
therein allows for the issuance of such an order before a 
complaint has been filed. Rule 6 5 (A) ( e) provides for the 
granting of such an order: 
(2) When it appears from the pleadings or by 
affidavit that the commission or continuance of 
some act during the litigation would produce great 
or irreparable injury to the party seeking 
injunctive relief. (Emphasis added) 
This rule should be read in contrast with the preceding subsec-
tion which requires the pleadings to be "on file." Under 
Subsection (2) there is no such requirement. 
Rule 65(A) (e) continues and allows such an order~ 
(4) In all other cases where an injunction 
would be proper in equity. 
It has been stated that "irreparable injury and the 
inadequacy of remedy at law" confer equity power upon a court 
Md supply the "jurisdictional requisites" to grant the order, 
-7-
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42 Am. Jur. 2d, Injunctions, §269. Thus, Judge Dee had 
jurisdiction at the time he signed the Order because he fou~ 
that the board's actions would cause immediate and irreparable 
harm. 
To argue that a court cannot issue a temporary 
restraining order before pleadings have been filed is to arg~ 
that the court has no equity power. In this case Judge Dee 
had all the pleadings before him when he made his decision ~ 
sign the Order and he was informed that the pleadings would be 
filed later that afternoon as soon as they could be taken ~ 
Manti, Utah. 
Moreover, Rule 5 (e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
allows the filing of pleadings by delivering them to the judge 
who must note the date thereon and transmit the papers to the 
clerk forthwith. This was done by Judge Dee and the papers 
were delivered to Plaintiffs' counsel for transmittal to the 
District Court. Thus, even if the filing of the complaint were : 
a prerequisite to the court's obtaining jurisdiction, the 
papers were "filed" with Judge Dee. 
Even if there were a requirement that some initiai 
pleadings be filed before the temporary restraining order 
became valid, the filing of the pleadings on the afternoon of 
September 22, and prior to service upon the Defendants would 
immediately confer jurisdiction upon the Court and the order 
-8-
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would be effective as issued at that time from the Clerk's 
office. Thus, even if the Defendants' argument had any merit 
that Judge Dee had no jurisdiction at 2:15 o'clock p.m. to 
sign tBe Order, jurisdiction would have automatically attached 
at 5:00 o'clock p.m. when all the pleadings were filed. See 
e.g. Ballard v. Buist, 8 U.2d 308, 333 P.2d 1071 (1959). 
The lower court rightfully held that Judge Dee had 
been properly appointed by the Court Administrator's Office, 
that Judge Dee had authority to hear the matter, that he had 
jurisdiction over the matter even before the filing of the 
complaint, and that even if a defect existed, it was cured 
through the subsequent filing of the papers with the Sanpete 
County Clerk. (see R. at 178-180.) 
POINT III 
THE DEFENDANTS AND MR. BLONQUIST WERE 
IN CONTEMPT OF THE LOWER COURT'S ORDER. 
The Court's Order of September 22, 1977, prohibited 
and restrained the Defendants "from appointing a new superin-
tendent of the North Sanpete School District". Appellants 
do not contend that the contemptuous actions were not taken, 
but only that their intentional disregard of the restraining 
order is not punishable on technical grounds. 
Rule 65(d) provides that a restraining order is 
binding "upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, 
- 9-
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servants, employees and attorneys and upon those persons in 
active concert or participation with them who receive actual 
notice of the order by personal service or otherwise." (emphasis 
added) • (Rule 65(d), U.R.C.P.) Defendants and their legal 
counsel had actual notice of the restraining order. (R. at 178). 
Defendants' counsel knew that Judge Dee had been appointed to 
hear the matter in the absence of Judge Tibbs and that the Sworn 
Accusation and Order had been filed with the Clerk in Sanpete 
County and that it bore the seal of the Court. (Tr. at 234). In 
spite of this, Defendants and their counsel decided to "ignore" 
the Order. (Tr. at 2 3 9, 2 4 0) . Thereupon the Appellants and each 
of them, intentionally and knowingly defied the Court Order and 
selected a new Superintendent of Schools for the North Sanpe~ 
School District. Such actions were in contempt of the Court 
Order issued earlier that day. Moreover, acting in good faith 
or on the advice of counsel is not a defense available to Defen-
dants. Gunnison Irrigation co. v. Peterson, 74 Utah 460, 466, 
280 P. 715 (1929). 
Section 78-32-1 of the Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
defines what actions or omissions constitute contempt under Utah 
law. Among those actions listed are: 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order 
or process of the court. 
* * * 
( 9) Any other unlawful interference with the process 
or proceedings of a court. 
Appellants intentionally defied the Court's Temporary 
Restraining Order and were in contempt of court for such dis-
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obedience. Defendants and their counsel had available to them 
the appropriate means to test the order of the Court as suggested 
by the Code of Professional Responsibility: 
A lawyer shall not disregard or advise his client 
to disregard a standing rule of a tribunal or a 
ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a pro-
ceeding, but he may take appropriate steps in 
good faith to test the validity of such rule or 
ruling. Code of Prof. Resp. DR 7-106 (A). 
POINT IV 
THE ACTIONS OF DEFENDANTS AND THEIR LEGAL 
COUNSEL IN VIOLATING THE COURT'S ORDER WERE 
CONTEMPTUOUS EVEN IF THE ORDER WAS INVALID. 
Appellants argue that disobedience of an "unlawful" 
order is not punishable as contempt. Respondents assume that 
"unlawful" is meant thereby to connote "invalidity" due to lack 
of jurisdiction. Respondents submit that a temporary restraining 
order of the court is not "unlawful", nor "invalid" until set 
aside through "orderly" mea:ps. 
In Bullock v. United States, 265 F.2d 683 (6th Cir. 
1959), the court considered the question of contempt. The 
lower court had issued an injunction restraining the school 
district from segregation within the schools. That injunction 
was violated and contempt proceedings were had. The defendants 
argued that they could not be guilty of contempt because the 
~junction was invalid. The sixth circuit held that the injunc-
tion was valid, but stated: 
Even if the injunction was invalid, app~llan~ wa~ 
chargeable with criminal contempt for vi~lating it, 
for the order of the District Court was in full 
force and effect until set aside in an orderly way. 
(Cites omitted) 265 F.2d at 691. 
-11-
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Likewise, the parties in this case had an obligation to obey t~ 
Order even if invalid and should have tried to set the Order 
aside through "orderly" means rather than simply decide to choose 
whether they wanted to obey the authority of this Court. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that one may be 
punished for contempt for violating a temporary restraining 
order even if the court subsequently found that it could not 
make the injunction permanent. In Hayes v. Towles, 95 Idaho 
208, 506 P.2d 105 (1973), the court said: 
The order violated by the petitioner was in the 
nature of a temporary restraining order issued 
pending a determination of jurisdiction. In 
general, a court has the power to order the pre-
servation of the status quo while it determines 
its own authority to grant relief, and the viola-
tion of a restraining order issued for that purpose 
may be punished as criminal contempt, even if the 
court subsequently determines that it is without 
jurisdiction to grant the ultimate relief requested. 
506 P.2d at 109. 
Appellants reliance on the case of In Re Rogers I Estate, r 
I 
75 Utah 290, 284 P. 992 (1930) is unwarranted. That case dealt 
with a probate court order which exceeded the bounds of jurisdic-
tion granted probate courts under the statutory laws of Utah. W 
the present case, we are not dealing with the question of whether 
a temporary restraining order can ever be issued by a district 
court, but only with the question of the timing of the order. 
I Unlike Rogers, Appellants make no claims that the temporary I 
f the distric:I restraining order exceeded the jurisdictional grant o 
court. 
ld h Sought to. I The Defendants and their counsel shou ave 
challenge the order or waited until the hearing of the preliminar : 
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injunction. For them to have substituted their own judgment 
as to the validity of the order is unacceptable. In this 
regard our own Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
"The defendant in this case was bound to obey the 
injunction, and, when he interfered with the 
court's order, he was acting at his peril. He 
certainly ought not to have acted upon his own 
judgment as to what his rights were, when it was 
manifest that his acts would, at least, amount 
to a technical violation of the terms of the in-
junction. It was not for him to set up his own 
opinion as to the meaning and effect of the in-
junction. If he entertained any doubt as to 
what he might do without violating the injunction, 
he should have applied to the court for a modif i-
cation of the injunction, or for the privilege of 
doing certain acts which, by the advice of counsel, 
he claims he had the right to do." Gunnison 
Irrigation co. v. Peterson, supra at 74 U. 466. 
POINT V 
THIS COURT DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION 
OVER THIS APPEAL. 
On May 1, 1978, fhe parties orally argued Respondents' 
Motion To Dismiss. The basis behind Respondents' motion was 
that no timely notice of appeal had been filed by either Mr. 
Blonguist, nor the three Defendant Board Members. On that 
same date, this Court denied the motion to dismiss and the 
parties continued with the appeal. 
Despite the fact that no Notice of Appeal was filed 
within one month after the contempt order was signed and 
entered, the thrust of Appellants argument was that the order 
appealed from was continuing in nature in that the court reserved 
l~isdiction thereon as to a possible jail sentence and award 
I 
1 of attorneys fees. 
L -13-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Such an argument flies in the face of the one month 
requirement to file a Notice of Appeal. (See Rule 73(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure). Appellants are not appealing 
the punishment ordered by the court, but only the correctness 
of the finding of the contempt order itself. Appellants' brief 
does not object to any error in the fines, jail sentence, or 
award of attorneys fees ordered by the lower court, but only 
object to whether or not they were in contempt. The contempt 
order was made on September 30, 1977 and entered in December 
12, 19 7 7. (R. at 177-180). The Notice of Appeal was filed 
January 25, 1978. (R. at 197). Every order to which Appellants 
object was made on September 30, 1977. 
Furthermore, the fact that the court retained juris-
diction of both the main case and the issues of the suspended 
jail sentence and of attorney's fees on the contempt charge 
does not toll the period of time in which a notice of appeal 
was required by Rule 73(a). In re Estate of Voorhees, 12 Utah 
2d 361, 366 P. 2d 977 (1961) dealt with a problem where the 
court made an order but retained jurisdiction to decide further 
related matters. This court held that the appealing party 
only had one month from the date of the first adjudication in 
which to appeal that order, stating: 
"However, cutting through the brush of attempted 
procedural forensics, it will be seen that the 
real issue between the parties and before the 
court has whether the mountain ground belonged 
to Mrs. Voorhees or to the estate. Upon plenary 
hearing thereon, the issue was resolved ag~inst 
her. The fact that the court retained jurisdic-
tion as mentioned above to adjudicate further 
matters did not leave open for reconsideration 
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I 
I 
l 
the question as to who owned that property. There 
was nothing further to be decided on that parti-
cular issue and she was ordered to transfer it to 
the estate. That being so, the decree entered 
thereon was final and therefore appealable. Since 
she took no appeal within the time allowed by law, 
that decree is conclusive." 366 P. 2d at 980. 
In the present case, the contempt order was final and the court's 
retention of jurisdiction does not toll the appeal time. The 
Notice of Appeal filed January 25, 1978 was not timely and this 
court "is compelled to order a dismissal thereof" if it makes 
such a finding. In Re Estate of Ratliff, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 
'.2d 571, 574-75 (1967). 
CONCLUSION 
If a party can make himself a judge of the validity 
of orders which have been issued, and by his own 
act of disobedience set them aside, then are the 
courts impotent, and what the Constitution now fit-
tingly calls the "judicial power of the United States" 
would be a mere mockery. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & 
Range Co. 221 US 418, 450, 55 L. ed 797, 809, 31 S. Ct. 
492, 34 LRA (NS) 874 (1911). (Cited in United States 
v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258 at 
288, 67 s.ct. at 694, 91 L.ed at 884 (1946). 
Plaintiffs-Respondents pray for affirrnance of the 
~wer court's order, in addition to awarding to the Plaintiffs 
their costs and reasonable legal fees on this appeal. 
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Earl Jay Peck 
Bruce J. Nelson 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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